From the Taegu front... the commander
of the 27th Regiment, Col. John Michaelis, said the night now ending in Korea and the next one
"will determine whether we lose Taegu or break their backs completely"
...United Press, 24 Aug 50
On July 29, 1950, General Walker issued his "stand or die" order, essentially passing on General MacArthur’s order that there would be no more withdrawal, to his division commanders. The Eighth Army had to hold. The North Koreans were advancing rapidly along the Korean Peninsula. Morale of most of the Americans in Korea was very low. Commanders were using phrases like "temporary withdrawal" and "readjustment of the lines." Troops were more accurately calling it "bugging out." It did not conceal the fact that the enemy was winning. Day by day the American and Republic of Korea (ROK) perimeter was shrinking. North Korean forces were less than 50 miles from Pusan and the Americans were in danger of being forced back into the sea. The 27th Infantry Regiment and it’s new commander had done the most professional job of delaying the North Koreans at Hwanggan of any American Army unit yet employed, earning the first Presidential Unit Citation of the war. The upcoming defense of the provisional capital of Taegu would help turn the tide of the war by delaying the North Korean (NK) Army with effective use of combined artillery, armor, anti-tank and tactical air attacks and a well designed defense in depth.
John "Mike" Michaelis had a desk job in the operations section (G3) of the Eighth Army Headquarters in Yokohama, Japan. He was selected to replace Colonel John Childs who had been in command of the regiment at Camp Sakai, Japan. Colonel Childs was considered by the command to be too old to effectively command in combat and was reassigned as the 25th Infantry Division’s chief of staff. Childs was a Special Service Officer in the Pacific Theater in World War II and had been assigned to the 27th as his final tour before retirement.
Michaelis on the other hand was only 37 years old and looked much younger. He graduated from West Point in 1936 and went on to serve a tour with General "Vinegar Joe" Stilwell in the Philippines. During World War II he had parachuted into Normandy with the 502d Parachute Infantry Regiment and took command after it’s commander was injured in the jump. He jumped into both Holland and Bastogne, being wounded in each operation. He finished World War II as the chief of staff for the 101st Airborne Division and then went on to serve as General Eisenhower’s aide-de-camp.
Colonel William Bartlet, the Eighth Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, told Michaelis "Congratulations. You’re now the commander of the 27th Regimental Combat Team of the 25th Division" and four hours later he was on a train to Osaka where he boarded a plane bound for Taejon. He met his new officers and soldiers at the docks in Pusan. He told a reporter for the Saturday Evening Post about his feelings on his new command. "It was a pretty depressing assignment. I was new. My executive officer was new. Some of the officers – only a few— were seeing green grasshoppers on their shoulders at the very thought of going to war." Even more depressing was the poor state of the regiment’s weapons and equipment and, as Michaelis was soon to discover, their combat training.
The one thing the regiment had going for it that others units may not have was a strong esprit de corps. Like most other regiments the 27th was housed on a regimental post and daily life revolved around the regiment and competitive sports. Competition between companies, battalions and intra-regimental contests improved unit cohesion and moral. Throughout the regimental area pictures and murals depicted the history of the regiment. World War II veterans in the regiment passed along the history and traditions of the regiment. "We heard ‘Wolfhound’ from reveille until taps" recalls one officer.
Training space on the small camp did not allow tactical training and the larger local training area was only large enough for squad operations. Much of the training took place in company dayrooms and barracks. Weapons training was done with old worn-out WWII weapons and equipment.
"In Japan we had weapons and equipment that were first issued, and used, in WWII, and were well worn. During the annual battalion 2.36 rocket launcher range firing we sometimes had to postpone, since none of the battalion’s 30 or so launchers would fire. Sometimes this was due to bad ammo, but usually due to the faulty launchers. The same was true of the M1 rifles and BARs (Browning Automatic Rifle). They were so worn from WWII use that most would fire only single rounds. Radio communications was poor due to the old equipment and lack of batteries."
The Eighth Army's "Fire Brigade"
Michaelis correctly believed that there was "too much stress put on Information and Education and not enough stress put on rifle marksmanship and scouting and patrolling…they have not had enough training in plain, old-fashioned musketry." After a few days in command of the 27th Infantry he received the first of two battlefield commissions to full Colonel. One of his sergeants once told a reporter, "He’s either going to be a big man in this Army—or a dead one." The regiment was soon to receive a lot of publicity as it became the much heralded Eighth Army "Fire Brigade". Much of the 27th Infantry’s media coverage was due to it’s photogenic and articulate commander. In a month of almost continuous combat the 27th Infantry had proved it had something no other unit had. That something was the infatiguable spirit of the Wolfhounds and a Regimental Commander who knew how to fight.
The Regiment was sent to the Sangju-Taegu Corridor, north of Taegu on the Taegu-Tabu-dong-Sangju road, to stop a possible armor attack on Taegu. Intelligence reports had placed one North Korean infantry regiment and six T-34 medium tanks two miles north of their location. In reality the North Koreans had the 13th Division, augmented with Soviet T-34 medium tanks, inside the Tabu-dong corridor driving toward Taegu, and another two divisions in reserve. On August 18 1950 the regiment was ordered to attack north along the road to restore the lines held by the ROK 1st Division. Two ROK regiments, the 11th and 13th, would attack along the high ground on each side of the road.
The regiment established a line of departure just north of Tabu-dong. At 1300 hours, two battalions supported by C Company, 73d Tank Battalion and C Company, 65th Engineer Battalion moved out along the Highway 5, the Taegu-Sangju road. The 1st Battalion screened the hills to the west and the 2nd Battalion screened the East side. The M-26 Sheridan tanks moved down the road supporting both formations. Within two hours the Wolfhounds had moved two and a half miles down Highway 5, outdistancing the ROK regiments fighting on the ridgelines.
The two battalions of the 27th went into a perimeter defense at 4:10 p.m. just north of the village of So-ri, at a road junction about 15 miles northwest of Taegu. To their north the Korean poplar tree-lined Highway 5 ran straight for over a mile in the narrow valley before forking. The 1st and 2nd Battalions dug in about 500 yards apart forming a "U" shaped line between the hills of the valley. The 1st Battalion was on the left (west) side of the road and 2nd on the right with E Company straddling the dusty road. From the top left side of the "U", C Company occupied high ground protecting the left flank. A Company was to it’s right and slightly back on the next ridgeline. The right side of the "U" had G Company protecting the flank slightly behind F Company.
The two companies that were to bear the brunt of enemy attacks were B Company covering from the road west across a narrow stream and up into the hills of the narrow valley and E Company holding the road. The regiment presented a four company front (A, B, E, and F companies) with C and G companies on the flanks. One platoon of M-26 tanks set up two tanks on the road and another two in the streambed. Six anti-tank teams with 3.5-inch bazookas dug in with the two front companies. The engineers, and a platoon of tanks completed the loose perimeter defense about one mile to the rear protecting the 8th and 37th Field Artillery (FA) Battalions. The far flanks on the mountain ridges to either side of the valley was held by the ROK 1st Division, commanded by General Paik.
Screened by a series of hills in the village of Sinjumak, the commander of the NK II Corps was massing his tanks for the coming assault. Lieutenant General Kim Mu Chong was the famed leader of the Chinese 8th Route Army and had trained under Chiang Kai-sheck, The majority of his soldiers were tried and tested battle veterans of World War II. He looked at the situation and decided to hit the Wolfhounds head-on that night. Night attacks by the NK army were characterized by intense mortar and artillery bombardment followed by armor and infantry assault. Bugles and green flares were used to coordinate NK actions. Gene Rohling was a machine-gunner assigned to H Company and recalled the night attacks. "They used green flares and bugles a lot…[it] was very disconcerting if you were just sitting there in defensive position and all of the sudden these bugles would start out and the flares would start shooting up in the air right in front of you – it sort of ruined your night’s sleep."
Shortly after dark General Kim’s artillery began firing at the 27th. The 8th Field Artillery War Diary shows that the attack was underway at 10 p.m. with "artillery, tanks and mortars." Out in the valley the enemy was leading with two tanks and dismounted infantry. Infantry mounted on trucks and at least three more tanks followed. The second tank fired repeatedly into F Companies position with it’s 85 mm main gun trying to get the Wolfhounds to disclose their positions for the lead tank and the supporting infantry. As the lead tank closed to within 50 yards of the lead American position, a bazooka team from F Company fired and destroyed the second tank. The lead tank was hit twice with dud rounds but destroyed when the forward observer, 1LT Lewis Millett, called in artillery fire. The 8th Field Artillery Battalion’s war diary goes on to say that by 10:30 p.m. "it is reported that we have knocked out 1 tank, crippled one, and made one turn and run, and two more are under fire in "B" Companys [sic] position." A second attack was made just before 5 a.m., but accurate artillery and mortar fire pushed them back to the north.
For Michaelis – and General Walker – failing to stop the North Korean advance would mean the loss of Taegu and its vital communications center and double tracked railroad line to the port of Pusan. If General Chung could defeat the 27th Infantry, he could split the UN forces in two right down the middle, drive south to Pusan and end the war. For six more nights in a row he desperately slammed his armor into the 27th Infantry’s forward elements. North Korean tanks would drive down the road to within 100 yards of American positions and recon by fire with their 85mm guns. The shells would scream down the road, hit the first elevation change and bounce, crashing thunderously into the nearby hillside. Men nick-named the road "The Bowling Alley" It is described in the Eighth Army War Diary, "The rounds fired down the Alley hit the rocks and armor in the area and sound almost like a bowling alley."
The next morning saw the use of tactical air support as well as mortar and artillery exchanges throughout the day. The 27th continued to dig in and improve their defense. A series of trip flares, home-made booby traps, anti-tank and anti-personnel mines were emplaced about 150 yards in front of the main defensive line and another set of anti-tank mines were laid on the ground 100 yards past that. The mines would stop the North Korean tanks and force their infantry to remove them. Flares would illuminate the area and expose the infantry to murderous direct fire from the dug in positions. The ROK regiments on the ridges counter-attacked and gained some ground. The 23d Infantry Regiment moved up to defend the artillery battalions and provide a deeper defense behind the 27th Infantry’s front line. Enemy artillery fire began falling soon after dark. The enemy attacked the 2nd Battalion area just before 2 a.m. The battle raged on for just over two hours. The combined anti-tank and small arms fire from the front lines and the 105mm and 155mm artillery fire from the four artillery batteries broke up the attack and the NK forces pulled back to the North. The North Koreans were using a series of green flares to designate areas to be attacked. Not to be outdone the regiment used it’s own green flares to draw the North Korean attack into the main defensive lines causing heavy casualties.
On the morning of August 20th there was a spot just forward of the front lines with twelve destroyed T-34 tanks that earned the nickname "the motor park." Air Force tactical air support attacked NK positions throughout the day while sporadic enemy artillery and mortar fire was received during the day and into the night. The nightly attack began at 5 p.m. with heavy concentrations of 120mm-mortar fire. The attacking armor and infantry were repulsed by 11 p.m. Two platoons of infantry and three attached tanks patrolled forward to estimate enemy losses soon after daylight. The estimate was recorded in the 8th FA war diary.
"Confirmed report for damage done on the 20th, 5 tansk [sic], 1 2½ ton truck, 2 – 75mm SP guns, 2 – 37mm AT guns, 1 – 120mm mortar, 60 enemy dead and estimated 600 dead."
Heavy concentrations of mortar and artillery fire began falling just after 9 p.m. as the NK army prepared for the night’s attack. The NK’s attacked both the ROK regiments on the ridgeline above the American positions and straight down Highway 5 at the 27th Infantry. The company commander of C Company counted at least 19 vehicles in the attacking column at the beginning of the attack. Intense fighting on both sides lasted until dawn but the American’s still held the road. A Time reporter who was present described the battle. "The Reds sent 9 tanks and a half-dozen assault guns. They started coming shortly after dark and kept right on trying until 5a.m." Patrols went out in the daylight and estimated the enemy suffered 1,300 casualties during the night. Time reported the aftermath of the battle, "About their position were strewn the Communists they had killed. There were also scattered legs, arms, and heads. The flies were terrible and the stench was worse."
Frustrated, General Chung had changed tactics and tried to cut the road to Taegu by enveloping the regiment. He sent the fresh troops of the 1st Regiment, 1st NK Division through a hole in the ROK lines on Michaelis’ right flank. They moved some six miles south where they attacked the main supply line, the 27th Infantry’s regimental command post (CP), 8th Field Artillery Battalion command post and one battalion of the 23d Infantry Regiment. A heavy barrage started at 4 p.m. and less than half an hour later two direct hits put the 8th Field Artillery Fire Direction Control Center out of operation, killing 6 and wounding another 7. The position did not have overhead cover because it was believed to be safe enough in a defilaide position. During the attack on the 27th Infantry’s regimental CP many of the non-combatants grabbed weapons while the half-dozen reporters dove for cover. Life Photographer H.G. Walker related the actions of one Sergeant who later received the Silver Star.
"Mess Sergeant Rogers while preparing hot chow found himself and his pots and pans attacked from the rear. He and one of his helpers dove for a .50 caliber machine gun. When they ran out of ammunition, Rogers went 50 yards under fire for more. When his buddy was killed, Rogers picked up the gun and chased off a platoon of Reds in that terrible sort of rage which mess sergeants usually reserve for KPs who put too much salt in the potatoes."
Others showed heroism in different ways. New York Herald Tribune’s War Correspondent Marguerite Higgins left out her part of the story when she cabled in her eyewitness story of the attack. Colonel Michaelis later wrote the editor of the Tribune to set the story straight. "Miss Higgins, completely disregarding her own personal safety, voluntarily assisted by administering blood plasma to the many wounded as they were carried into the temporary Aid Station [which] was subjected to small arms fire throughout the attack… The Regimental Combat Team considers Miss Higgins’ actions on that day as heroic…in saving the lives of many grievously wounded men."
A United Press reporter with the 27th Infantry sent in a report that described the fighting on August 22, 1950.
"The Communists launched their fifth straight night of attacks on the 27th Regiment at dusk Tuesday night. The Reds swarmed down from ridges they had seized in a drive through South Korean lines on the American’s right flank two days ago…the 27th called on B-26 light bombers, Mustangs, and jet shooting stars fighters for help. They dropped 22 tons of bombs on Communist positions. American artillery, mortars, tanks and machine-guns knocked out two Red self-propelled guns, four mortars and several machine-guns, but that didn’t deter the Communists. At the blast of a bugle, the Red infantry came charging out of the hills."
The NK forces were massing on Michaelis’s right flank in preparation of an all out attack. Michaelis related the story of what happened in a later interview with Air Force Magazine. "We had been enflanked by a Commie regiment. It was a pretty tight spot. Our forward air controller
[USAF Lt Creech] picked up a flight of seven B-26s which had been unable to hit their primary target." Although the B-26s were low on fuel, they made one pass, dropping 44,000 lbs of bombs into the concentration of Red soldiers. That night the enemy made it’s usual attack but was easily repulsed. Counter-attacks the next morning by the 23d Infantry cleared the high ground to the east of Michaelis’ defense. The last attack before the Eighth Army commander reassigned the 27th took place just after midnight on August 24th. Combined fires of artillery, M-26 main gun rounds and anti-tank gunnery repulsed the enemy force of a few tanks supported by two companies of infantry.
The North Korean Army had suffered heavy losses in both the night attacks against the Wolfhound roadblock and in the daylight rocket, bomb, and napalm air attacks by Air Force, Navy and Australian planes. Crippling 90mm tank fire and artillery fire from 105mm and 155mm howitzers at pre-registered target points and targets called in by forward observers decimated General Chung’s forces. The defense of Taegu was accomplished by extensive use of combined arms and a regiment of men determined to stand and fight.
As a result of the Battle of the Bowling Alley, the regiment earned it’s second Presidential Unit Citation of the war. The 27th departed for Mason and a well deserved 48-hours of rest before the upcoming NK Naktong Offensive. The units that replaced the Wolfhounds were not as fortunate. Ironically only a few days later the Bowling Alley area and south past Tabu-dong would be overrun by General Chung’s 13th Division and held until the 7th and 8th Cavalry retook it on September 21, 1950.
Notes
The 27th Infantry always had a lot of media near the regimental CP. At several points during the Battle of the Bowling Alley the press would come into the CP, which was located in a culvert, and sit down. To the exasperation of the regimental staff, they always sat on overlay boards wiping the grease pencil off. According to Robert Hill, a platoon leader at the time, the reasons for the extensive press coverage have to include the young, photogenic (a news article states Michaelis was remembered as one of the handsomest men to attend the Military Academy) and articulate regimental commander who loved the spotlight and who didn’t get killed; the regiment was the first regiment to hold the line against the North Korean’s; and the Public Information Officer (PIO) never let the media down lower than the regimental CP unescorted (there were a few rare exceptions)
Newspaper clipping
archive
Further Reading
Appleman, Roy E., South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (1961) Center of Military History, Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., 813p.
_____. "The Bowling Alley Fights" Army (Apr 1961), pp. 44-49
Bell, James, "The General Gambles" Life (August 21 1950) pp. 18-21
Cobb, F.J. "Eighth Field Artillery Battalion War Diary for 1-31 August 1950" Unpublished
Ent, Uzal W. BG(Ret.) Fighting on the Brink: Defense of the Pusan Perimeter (1996) Turner Publishing Company, Paducah, KY
Dvorchak, Robert J. Battle for Korea: The Associated Press History of the Korean Conflict, (1993) Combined Books, Pennsylvania
Hill, Robert W., Electronic Mail to Major Richard Wiersema, October 12 1997
Hoberecht, Earnest "US Forces also alerted before Pusan" The Pittsburg Press (24 August 1950)
Leckie, Robert, Conflict: The History of the Korean War (1996) Da Capo Press, Inc, New York, New York, 448p.
Loosbrock, John F. "Gen. Mike Likes: An Exclusive Interview with a Man Who Knows" Air Force Magazine, date unknown, Photocopy of original, 27th Infantry Regimental Museum, Hawaii, p. 34-35
Marshall, S.L.A., The River and the Gauntlet, (1953) William Morrow & Company, New York, 385p.
Martin, Harold H. "The Colonel Saved the Day" Saturday Evening Post (9 September 1950) photocopy
Michaelis, Mike and Davidson, Bill "This we learned in Korea" Colliers, 18 (August 1951), pp. 13-15, 38-39, 42-44
O’Reilly, Hugh F. Wolfhound Reflections (1996) 27th Infantry Regiment, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii 42p.
Osborne, John, "US Counters Mass with Mobility" Life (August 21 1950) pp. 15
Regan, Geoffrey, Snafu: Great American Military Disasters (1994) Avon Books, New York, New York, 295p.
Tomedi, Rudy, No Bugles, No Drums (1993) John Wiley & Sons, Inc, 259p.
Vermillion, Robert, United Press Writer, quoted in Hoberecht, Earnest, "US Forces Also Alerted Before Pusan" United Press Staff Writer, newspaper clipping, (date/newspaper unknown) Photocopy of original, 27th Infantry Regimental Museum, Hawaii
Wiersema, Richard, "No More Bad Force Myths: A Tactical Study of Regimental Combat in Korea, July 1950" Unpublished Monograph, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1997
Author Unknown, "At the Bowling Alley" War in Asia, Time (September 4, 1950), p. 21-22. Photocopy of original, 27th Infantry Regimental Museum, Hawaii
Author Unknown, "The Peripatetic 27th – It is Exhibit "A" of the US Defense Effort in Korea" Life, Volume 29, Number 11, September 11, 1950 p 43-46. Photocopy of original, 27th Infantry Regimental Museum, Hawaii
Author Unknown, "The Press, Pride of the Regiment" Time, September 25, 1950, page unknown, Photocopy of original, 27th Infantry Regimental Museum, Hawaii
Author Unknown, "Bloody Fight for Ground – Americans Hurl Troops, Planes, Tanks and Guns at Enemy" August 23, 1950, AP Wire Story, Newspaper Unknown, Photocopy of original, 27th Infantry Regimental Museum, Hawaii
27th Infantry in Korea -- 